Emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) are rapidly increasing their foreign direct investment around the world and, in particular, in the countries of Southern Europe. Although, international business scholars have been quick to put the spotlight on this new phenomenon, the cultural adaptation of EMNE subsidiaries to host-country environments, especially those of Europe, has remained largely unexamined. This question acquires particular relevance owing to the considerable cultural distance between emerging and developed economies and the isomorphic conflicts that can arise at the subsidiary level. Here, we examine this situation by reporting two case studies of Chinese subsidiaries operating in Spain. Our findings suggest that guanxi -the deep-rooted system of personal relations and social connections founded on mutual interests -plays a major role in the search for legitimacy undertaken by Chinese subsidiaries located in Southern Europe. The adoption and adaptation of Chinese cultural values and practices to the local environment allow the subsidiary to align itself with the culture of the parent organization at the same time as it embeds itself in the host environment, thus resolving any isomorphic conflicts.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the extent of the presence of Chinese EMNEs in Spain. Then, we examine the main theoretical arguments concerning the institutional and cultural features of Chinese subsidiaries. Section 4 discusses the research methods employed here. In the fifth section, we present our analyses and the results of our case studies of Chinese subsidiaries. Finally, we discuss our findings and identify both the limitations of this paper and future avenues of research.
Presence of Chinese EMNEs in Spain
Among its Asian partners, China has recently become the key player in the world economy in terms of FDI. Despite the ongoing slowdown in China, with an economy that is expected to grow at 6.3% in 2016 compared to 7.3% in 2014 (IMF 2016) , the country is set to continue its investments in the most developed countries, thus playing a major role in the FDI arena.
Spain is the 9 th largest destination for Chinese FDI among the EU-27 countries, behind the United Kingdom, Germany and France (Rhodium 2015) . Indeed, Spain's position as a recipient of Chinese investment has grown rapidly in recent years. According to the Spanish Foreign Investment Registry (DataInvex) 1 , the evolution of Chinese FDI in Spain accelerated dramatically from 2008 onwards, increasing from 26 to 610 million EUR between 2010 and 2014 (see Table 1 ). In just a few years, China rose to second place in the rankings behind only
Mexico, having occupied a distant 19 th place in 2009. This rapid growth means that today We identified 86 Chinese capital firms in Spain in 2013 in the SABI database 2 . These subsidiaries represent 6.14% of employees, 4.70% of operating revenue and 2.27% of assets of all the EMNEs with a direct presence in Spain (see Table 2 ). In terms of mean size, Chinese firms have caught up with their counterparts in other emerging Asian countries, including Korea. Therefore, among the many emerging countries included in this study, China is increasingly establishing itself as a highly relevant player in Spain. However, if we compare Chinese MNEs located in Spain with their counterparts from other developed countries, they still represent just a small fraction. This is in line with the data described above for Chinese outflows from the country. Indeed, the vast majority of Chinese 2 The SABI database (Iberian Balance Sheets Analysis System) includes financial data from more than 2,000,000
Spanish companies. The firms selected in our sample had to be subsidiaries in which at least 50.01% of their capital belonged to MNEs from the emerging countries selected. Note, we do not differentiate between investments from China and Hong Kong, given that Hong Kong serves as an important bridge for Chinese firms wishing to venture overseas (Aminian et al. 2008) , providing a platform for tax purposes and allowing them to avoid Chinese Government regulations (Ramasamy et al. 2012) . Besides, given Hong Kong's role in roundtripping, we have sought to exclude investments from developed economies or other foreign countries. (Khanna and Palepu 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra 2007 ).
An analysis of the capital ownership of Chinese subsidiaries in Spain reveals a degree of balance between public and private equity firms. While 52 firms (60.47%) are wholly owned by private investors, the remaining 34 companies (39.53%) are state-owned enterprises 4 In line with Hitt et al. (1997) to measure the degree of diversification we adopt the following criteria: a firm presents no diversification if it does not have a secondary NACE classification; a firm implements a relational diversification strategy if it has a secondary NACE that differs from its primary NACE at the three-digit level and which is equal at the two-digit level; finally, a firm presents non-relational diversification if its secondary NACE differs from its primary at both the two-and three-digit levels. 
Theoretical framework
The success of EMNEs in advanced countries challenges present FDI paradigms. The traditional theories that explain the activities of MNEs, and which were originally developed using empirical evidence from advanced economies, may be insufficient to account for the experiences of EMNEs (Buckley et al. 2007; Child and Rodrigues 2005; Gaffney et al. 2014; Guillén and García-Canal 2009; Mathews 2002 Mathews -2006 Ramamurti 2009 their accelerated pace of internationalization. In order to expand more rapidly they sometimes prefer to enter developed markets first using cross-border acquisitions rather than to enter other similar developing economies (Luo and Tung 2007) . By so doing, EMNEs can quickly On the one hand, the main motivation of Chinese EMNEs is the opportunity to expand their market share in other host economies (see Luo and Tung 2007) . This is confirmed by various econometric tests conducted on Chinese investment patterns (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2012) . According to Nicolas (2014) , the European Union is no exception and market seeking is found to be the main motivation for Chinese investment, with strategic asset seeking being ranked second. Indeed, Chinese MNEs are especially interested in acquiring natural resources and superior managerial and marketing skills in order to improve their competitive advantage in manufactured products (Chen 2008; Cui and Jiang 2010; Deng 2009; Rui and Yip 2008; Nicholson and Salaber 2013; Wang et al. 2012 ).
However, the Chinese government plays a major role in its MNEs and its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the scene. Before 2004, private firms were not permitted to invest overseas and access to foreign exchange was allowed only to approved SOEs (Ramasamy et al. 2012) . Thus, Chinese SOEs have been the main driver of the country's FDI, accounting for more than two thirds of total Chinese FDI worldwide (MOFCOM various; Morck et al. 2008) . Given this legacy of institutional dependence, Chinese FDI projects today continue to be subject to governmental approval (Child and Rodrigues 2005) as it seeks to ensure that investments are made in line with its resource allocation plans and priorities and that they reinforce China's global influence (Luo et al. 2010) . For this reason, the government monitors all foreign exchange outflows and all firms are required to report data to their corresponding provincial Bureau of Commerce (Hong et al. 2015) . The Chinese government strongly encourages outward FDI in those sectors considered a priority and these firms receive greater backing in terms of organizational support, access to capital and other key inputs than their counterparts in sectors where FDI is not a priority (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Si and Liefner 2014) .
Given the active role played by the Chinese government in the FDI processes, institutional theory (North 1990; Scott 1995) provides a good explanation of its overseas investments, highlighting the marked differences in the institutional frameworks of the emerging and developed economies. Indeed, several authors stress this perspective in seeking to understand the EMNE phenomenon (Gaffney et al. 2013; Wei et al. 2015) . For example, Peng et al. (2008) argue that the institution-based view constitutes, along with the industry-and resourcebased views, the third leg of the EMNE strategy tripod. Institutions are "the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction" (North 1990) , and according to Scott (1995) they can be conceptualized as a set of three pillars (regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive) 5 .
These three elements generate isomorphic pressures that may either encourage or constrain the behaviour of a subsidiary in a host-environment, thus affecting the firm's legitimacy in that setting (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995) , where legitimacy refers to "actors'
perceptions of the organization, as a judgment with respect to the organization, or as the behavioural consequences of perception and judgment, manifested in actors' actions-'acceptance, endorsement, and so forth'" (Bitektine 2011 ). As such, firms achieve legitimacy by means of becoming isomorphic as a result of their adopting practices and structures that are institutionalized in a certain environment (Kostova et al. 2008 ).
According to Wong (2012) adaptation to local institutional pressures is more challenging when having to contend with normative and cognitive differences than when facing regulative differences. While regulatory features tend to be more formalized and more widely accepted as a motive for local adaptation, norms and cognitive elements require intensive cross-cultural communication as they tend to be more difficult to grasp, and local knowledge is largely tacit (Boyacigiller et al. 2004) . Moreover, the governments of emerging countries may influence the inclination of EMNEs to expand abroad by placing SOEs under regulative and normative pressures to accommodate political objectives and "wave the national flag" (Deng 2009; Peng et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2012) . Thus, the pressures that SOEs face are great when they have to make their location decision and may not be relevant to their local adaptation in the host country. For these reasons, it is our contention that the cultural-cognitive pillar takes on considerable importance when these Chinese subsidiaries interact to become isomorphic in the host-environment.
Given their distinctive institutional and social environments, Chinese MNEs face a considerable cultural distance when making cross-border acquisitions in Europe. The Chinese institutional environment is characterized primarily by a centralized, state-controlled, authoritarian culture (Hofstede 2001) , and the importance of guanxi (the ancient system of personal relationships and social connections based on mutual interest and benefit) in business dealings (Hwang 1987; Kipnis 1997; Wang 2007; Yang, 1994) . Basically, guanxi can be considered to comprise various elements, including renqing (similar to the owing of a 'favour'), ganqing (translated into English as 'feelings') and xinren (closely related to 'trust'), which together are considered as reflecting the quality or strength of guanxi (Chen and Chen 2004; Kipnis 1997; Wang 2007; Wang et al. 2008 ).
Because of the cultural distance between their respective institutional environments, Chinese companies entering the European market for the first time face what is known as a 'liability of foreignness' (Buckley and Casson 1976; Hymer 1960 , Zaheer 1995 , a heavy burden that is not easily shed and which may result in additional costs for those firms that are new to a foreign market. The greater the cultural distance, the greater this liability of foreignness will be. According to Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) , there is a close link between the liability of foreignness and the need of legitimacy of foreign firms in different cultural and institutional environments. By entering a host country by means of an M&A, foreign firms seek to overcome their lack of local knowledge and these liabilities (Klossek et al. 2012 ).
Additionally, the subsidiaries of EMNEs in developed countries not only have to achieve external legitimacy (i.e., the acceptance of local players in the host country), but also retain internal legitimacy (i.e., the adoption of the institutionalized practices of the parent company and conformity with its cultural values) (Kostova et al. 2008) . These often diametrically opposed environments can simultaneously exert isomorphic pulls on foreign subsidiaries, in what has been described as an 'isomorphic conflict' (Forsgren 2013) . This seems to be especially challenging for Chinese subsidiaries as their requisites of internal legitimacy can differ substantially from those of their external legitimacy, because of the great institutional distance between China and Europe. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the two pressures in order to achieve the right levels of external and internal legitimacy and, so, have to promote the integration of the Chinese multinational within a distant institutional environment while, at the same time, seeking to understand guanxi practices so as to maintain good relations with their multinational corporation.
Comparatively little research has been conducted to illustrate how Chinese subsidiaries struggle to adapt to their host-environment, and even less research has been devoted to examine how guanxi business practices are adapted to western business styles. Of the few existing studies, Si and Liefner (2014) introduced the concept of cognitive distance into the analysis of Chinese subsidiaries to study the knowledge gap that exists between parent and subsidiary; and, Wong (2012) analysed the difficulties faced by a Chinese SOE seeking to acquire a company in Australia due to institutional frictions and fear amongst the host population. Here, it is our contention that an exploration of the use of guanxi outside Chinese borders may help explain how a Chinese subsidiary in a developed country balances its need to manage globally (alignment of practices with parent organization culture) with its need to manage locally (conformity to institutional pressures of the host country) as it seeks to resolve issues of isomorphic conflict and achieve both internal and external legitimacy.
Methods
Given the current lack of understanding of the isomorphic conflict faced by Chinese subsidiaries in developed countries, we adopt a qualitative case study methodology to examine the cultural adaptation of Chinese subsidiaries to the host country. This is particularly apposite when seeking to further our understanding of a phenomenon employing an inductive approach, since it allows us to address more fully the complexity of the problem, The case study includes two Chinese subsidiaries based in Spain. The selection of these two cases fulfils the criteria of theoretical sampling, given that they were chosen for their relevance and expected contribution to the objectives of the research (Eisenhardt 1989 ). More specifically, the criteria guiding the choice of the two subsidiaries were: (1) they had to be state-owned enterprises, since the government has considerable influence over Chinese MNEs; (2) both service and manufacturing industries had to be represented; (3) they had to be located in the same geographical area, so that they enjoyed the same opportunities for integrating within the local environment and establishing guanxi connections; and finally (4) they had to be managed by both local and expatriates managers, so that they were exposed to similar cognitive differences. Table 4 provides an overview of the two companies selected and their basic characteristics. held with local managers of the Chinese subsidiaries (see Table 4 ). These informants were selected on the basis of their being directly involved in the integration process of the subsidiary within Spain, their close relationship with Chinese managers both in the subsidiary and the MNE, and their first-hand knowledge of the subsidiary's guanxi practices.
The interviews were structured in two blocks in accordance with a predetermined script based on a review of the literature: the objective of the first block was to obtain an overview of the firm's entry strategy and development, the difficulties encountered in integrating within the host institutional environment and the dynamics associated with their strategies and interactions with the parent office. In the second block, respondents were asked to describe the dynamics associated with the subsidiary's guanxi practices, the motives for applying them in Spain and the way in which this was achieved.
Once the data had been collected we began our analysis by processing all the information and filtering out any irrelevant content. All the interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded in order to structure the data and to make sure that they could be reassessed if inconsistencies were found. We used narrative techniques to construct the story of the Chinese subsidiaries in Spain from their arrival to the present day. Subsequently, we identified the three component elements making up guanxi (that is, renqing, ganqing and xinren) based on the conceptual framework provided by Yen et al. (2011) and Wang (2007) . Any inaccuracies identified were resolved through mail exchange and direct phone calls.
These data was triangulated with information taken from complementary sources. We 
Results

Entry strategies: motivations and entry mode
The entry strategies of the two Chinese MNEs in Spain are similar despite the 14-year gap separating the two experiences. China Shipping entered the Spanish market in 1999 via a joint-venture with Pérez y Cía. The main purpose of this local alliance was to promote the commercial interests of China Shipping Group in Spain, whereby the local company serves as the consignee of the Chinese shipping company in the port of Barcelona. In Spain, as in many other countries, the law of maritime traffic obliges shipping companies to operate in ports through local consignees that act as mediators with port authorities, performing custom duties and being responsible for loading and unloading cargo and all commercial activity in the hostcountry. Thus, the entry of China Shipping Group into Spain was a strategic response to the barriers of entry (Dunning 1979) Finally, the degree of centralization of decision-making at the multinational level is a further factor that reflects the marked power distances in Chinese culture (Hofstede 2001 ) and which gives rise to the evident subordination of the Chinese subsidiaries. It should be noted that this relationship is further strengthened in the case of SOEs. Consequently, our two Chinese and explain it to them again and again". Once again, these differences between the two cultures accentuate the isomorphic conflict which has to be tackled in order to facilitate understanding.
Mitigating isomorphic conflict
The differences characterizing the two institutional environments, that is, the specific requirements for achieving both external and internal legitimacy, make cultural integration a great challenge. In their awareness of this, parent companies typically appoint mixed Chinese been reported by Si and Liefner (2014) and Klossek et al. (2012) in Germany, who likewise report the existence of mixed teams.
In China Shipping, the Spanish managers play a key role as enablers of the adaptation of Chinese expatriates, acting as a bridge between the local way of behaving (embedded in relationships with local agents) and the parent office's values (embodied in the Chinese expatriates A useful way to approach Chinese cultural values is via the adoption of guanxi -the ancient system of personal relationships and social connections based on mutual interest and benefit (Hwang 1987; Kipnis 1997 ) and one of the more deep-seated business practices in China -by local subsidiary managers. In the cases analysed, local subsidiary managers are encouraged to promote guanxi in their local relations so as to give a Chinese meaning to their actions, to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of expatriate managers and to win the favour of the For Chinese managers, reciprocity and empathy are essential for the success of their commercial relationships (Hwang 1987) , which are based on the continuous exchange of favours (renqing). Although it would seem that these principles form part of the universal language of business, in China personalized networks of influence, largely based on understanding and long-lasting linkages, constitute an especially strong guiding principle. As explained by the local subsidiary managers interviewed here, the subsidiaries have internalized these ways of proceeding and adhere to these rules of favours. In the case of The essence of any business relationship for a Chinese manager is continuous and repeated evidence of trust. Only over time and with the achievement of good outcomes is it possible to gain credibility (xinyong) and, so, build the bases of mutual trust and confidence (xinren) (Yen et al. 2011) . In this respect, the general manager of China Thus, thanks to the efforts of the Spanish managers and their attempts at promoting guanxi practices a mutual adaptation and rapprochement of cultures that facilitate understanding can be achieved. Indeed, by balancing these two forces, Chinese subsidiaries attain both internal and external legitimacy. In this context, and given the great cultural distance between China and Spain, Spanish managers have to be very careful to manage in accordance with the parent company's culture (internal legitimacy) without neglecting local requirements (external legitimacy) if they want to guarantee the success of the investment in the host country. In short, our results indicate that the greater the institutional distance between the MNE's home country and the subsidiary's host country, the more the subsidiary will seek to adapt the 
Conclusions and future research
Our findings show that, in line with the growth in global FDI from emerging countries, Chinese direct investment in Spain has experienced an upward trend in the last decade, above all during the period of international financial crisis. The phenomenon remains new and is relatively small compared to the investment of multinationals based in developed countries;
however, there is evidence that it is set to become more and more important in the future, despite the forecasts of a slowdown in the China economy.
Much of the success of Chinese FDI in Southern Europe is attributable to the integration of cultures in contexts where the distance between the respective institutional environments is great (Kostova and Zaheer 1999) and the way in which they go about resolving their isomorphic conflicts (Forsgren 2013) . In this respect, previous research has highlighted the significance of the Chinese tradition of guanxi and its widespread use in Chinese society (see, for example, Hwang 1987; Yang 1994; Lee and Dawes 2005; Huang et al. 2010) . However, to date little has been written about how Chinese firms interact with the cultures of their hostenvironments and how they deal with guanxi in foreign countries. In that sense, this article goes some way to filling this gap through its analysis of two Chinese subsidiaries located in Spain.
Our results show that guanxi is in widespread use beyond the borders of China too. Although
Chinese expatriates are fully aware of their liability of foreignness in developed markets precisely because of the marked cognitive-cultural distance between both environments, they are unable to discard guanxi practices as they are deeply-rooted in the Chinese way of doing The adaptation of guanxi practices to the local cultural environment can act as a 'social glue', allowing the subsidiary to align itself with the culture of the parent organization at the same time as it embeds itself in the host environment. Indeed, the subsidiary has to strive to achieve this balance between home-and host-country institutional contexts by adapting guanxi practices to local requirements. Within this process of isomorphic conflict resolution, local subsidiary managers take on a key role in the success of Chinese FDI in developed countries.
They act as a bridge, reducing the cultural-cognitive distance by transferring mutual knowledge between the host's institutional environment and that of the corporation. Here, we have highlighted the fact that adapting guanxi practices to the context of a developed country, such as Spain, is essential in enabling Chinese subsidiaries to balance their need to manage globally (in accordance with their parent organization's culture and, hence, to ensure their internal legitimacy) with the need to manage locally (in accordance with the social beliefs and values of the host country and, hence, to ensure their external legitimacy) (see Figure 1) . In short, this study provides additional insights to the guanxi literature by exploring how Chinese MNEs, and in particular their western subsidiaries, adjust their guanxi practices outside China in order to resolve the isomorphic conflict. 
